INSUBCONTINENT EXCLUSIVE:
TEHRAN- Regarding a recent report that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi presented to the IAEA Board of Governors, the Iranian
representative to the Vienna-based organizations provided an explanation on Saturday.What follows is the text of the explanatory note about
International Organizations in Vienna would like to share its comments and observations on the report as follows:A
The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined, as has also shown so-far, to comply with its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement (INFCIRC/214) and it has done its utmost to enable the Agency to continue its verification activities in Iran, which is unique in
On the issue related to the so-called three locations, it should be highlighted that the origin of the issue goes back to the fabricated
information provided to the Agency by an ill-intended third party, namely the Israeli regime, which does not accept to have a single
to peaceful purposes, contrary to the numerous IAEA and UNGA resolutions.B
Comments on the report, Background:3
June 2022 and INFCIRC/967 dated 3 December 2021), there has not been any undeclared location which is required to be declared under the CSA
environmental samples at a location cannot be considered as an indication that a quantity of nuclear material had been presented at that
assertion is merely based on false and fabricated information provided by illegitimate Israeli regime with a longstanding background of
Iran has explained its assumptions about the probable causes of the presence of uranium particles
Given the fact that Iran could not yet find any technical reasons for the presence of uranium particles, it would reasonably imply that
possibly external elements, such as sabotage and malicious acts, have been involved in the contamination.4
unless and until Iran provided technically credible explanations for the presence of the aforementioned uranium particles at the three
undeclared locations in Iran and informed the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated
nuclear material or contaminated equipment
Republic of Iran in numerous occasions, there has never been any undeclared location which is required to be declared under the CSA
Furthermore, based on our intensive investigations into the background of activities carried out in two remaining locations has not yet been
There has not been any nuclear activity or storage in these locations
Therefore, as yet no technical explanation concerning the origin of reported particles were found, however, the possibility of presence of
such particles by the sabotage acts cannot be excluded.5
The Agency's claim in footnote 7 that "..
some of the containers stored at Turquzabad were dismantled at the location, others were removed from Turquzabad intact in 2018 and moved to
an unknown location ..." is not based on authentic information and evidence
Turquzabad is actually an industrial place encompassing various kinds of warehouses and depots for storing detergents, chemicals,
foodstuffs, fabrics - textiles, vehicle tires and parts, tubes - joints and some industrial scraps
Movement of containers in and out of such an area is a usual activity; therefore, the claim of containers removal cannot be considered a
ground for such an allegation
Despite the lack of solid and authentic documents, Iran granted, on a voluntary basis, complementary access to the locations for the Agency
This clearly indicates Iran's willingness to address any possible ambiguity along with its full transparency.6
water, and UOC, are entirely out of scope of the CSA
assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme" has no legal basis and cannot be accepted.C
Comments on the report, Implementation of the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023:7
302.7 kg of natural uranium, as declared by Iran, in the form of solid waste and items of uranium metal transferred from the Jaber Ibn Hayan
Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL)
The Agency identified a discrepancy that needs to be resolved in the amount of nuclear material it had verified compared to the amount
the Agency by the operator and verified by the Agency since 2003, for which the relevant 90(a) and 90(b) statements have also been
subsequently provided by the Agency stating its satisfaction
was still sealed while it was transferred to the UCF
and processing of the concerned material has been in the presence of the Agency inspectors, they have taken volume and density data of the
dissolved material, but after completion of activities, they raised a doubt on measurement using an imprecise, nonconventional method that
is not expressed in the facility's Safeguards Approach with a reversed calculation based on U-236 isotopes to estimate dissolved material
Since the base of this measurement has not been accurate (there is a large difference between measures in 2003 and 2022) and is associated
with high errors, this method of reveres calculation has not been accepted by the operator instead of the direct measurement that has been
UNH batches before their blending (total 109.847 kg U), which was verified at the same time by the Agency inspectors, has been taken as the
basis for the accountancy reports of the UCF facility, and there is no need for any correction on the nuclear material accounting records
accepted and completely rejected
the 'Marivan /Abadeh' as supporting documents about this location, which refer to only two unauthentic images from an unknown location that
protecting shielding for the use of neutron detectors has principally no safeguards ground (based on article 2.8 and 69 of the CSA) and the
Agency's questions were not based on authentic information relevant to the purpose of safeguards for its request of access to the
location, the Islamic Republic of Iran based on goodwill voluntarily granted access to the Agency and provided explanations regarding
this extensive cooperation, the Agency has considered the information received from Iran as inconsistent with the said alleged documents,
just by reliance on some unauthentic and fabricated documents and then running into fallacious and invalid conclusion upon its own
neutron detectors and nuclear materials" is a baseless accusation without any authentic supporting evidence
This conclusion is absolutely false, unrealistic and biased
explosive testing." (in the Agency's report (GOV/2023/9, Para
4) and finally has changed to "explosive experiments with protected shielding in preparation for the use of neutron detectors and nuclear
This inconsistency in the DG's report shows that this allegation has no technical basis and cannot be accepted.9
As part of this process, the Agency expects to be able to start to address, without further delay, access to data recordings and the gaps in
centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows are manufactured, are entirely remained in scope of JCPOA on a voluntary basis and is out of obligations
cameras during period between February 2021 and June 2022 as well as those data recorded since 2-3 May 2023 currently are not subjected to
Comments on the report, Modified Code 3.1:10
Regarding the implementation of modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary Arrangements, it should be reminded that acceptance of implementation of
modified code 3.1 was among those transparency and confidence building measures, reflected in paragraph 65 of the JCPOA
Following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and failure of the E3/EU to fulfill any of their commitments within the JCPOA, Iran in response
ceased all transparency measures beyond its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
Based on this fact, implementation of modified code 3.1 was suspended
Therefore, the Agency's reference to Article 39 of the CSA has no legal basis.E
Comments on the report, Summary:11
material and nuclear-related activities", Iran did not oblige itself to consider unauthentic and fabricated documents as CSA basis to
respond the Agency's requests
that the Agency considers all fabricated documents and fake information provided by the Israeli regime as authentic, and concluded that
Such statement undermines impartiality of the Agency and is far from the professional approach need to be taken by the Agency.F
The Islamic Republic of Iran has so far rendered its full cooperation under the CSA to the Agency
It has to be re-emphasized that all Iran's nuclear material and activities have been completely declared and verified by the Agency.2
The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly expects that the Agency conduct its reporting on verification activities in Iran based on the
principals of impartiality, professionalism and objectivity.3
The Agency should not disregard the possibility of involvement of Iran's staunch enemies in providing false and fabricated information and
committing various sabotage acts.4
The verification activities related to the JCPOA such as production and inventory of centrifuges, centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows, heavy
water and uranium ore concentrate (UOC) are not under the CSA scope
Therefore, linking the assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program and resolution of the alleged issues to such
information are baseless and unacceptable.5
cooperation and voluntary transparency measures, questioning the peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear program has no justification.6
The Islamic Republic of Iran, once again, stresses that the current extensive level of its cooperation with the Agency has not been achieved
easily, just to be diminished by short-sighted political interests
Accordingly, all including the Agency and the Member States, have the responsibility to show wisdom in addressing such issues in a diligent
manner in order to avoid distorting the bigger picture on cooperation between Iran and the Agency.
